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1Full-Duplex Cyber-Weapon with Massive Arrays
Nam-Phong Nguyen, Hien Quoc Ngo, Trung Q. Duong, Hoang Duong Tuan, and Daniel B. da Costa
Abstract—In order to enhance secrecy performance of pro-
tecting scenarios, understanding the illegitimate side is crucial.
In this paper, from the perspective of the illegitimate side, the
security attack from a full-duplex cyber-weapon equipped with
massive antenna arrays is considered. To evaluate the behavior
of the proposed cyber-weapon, we develop a closed-form, a tight
approximation, and asymptotic expressions of the achievable
ergodic secrecy rate with taking into consideration imperfect
channel estimation at the cyber-weapon. The results show that
even under some disadvantage conditions, i.e., imperfect channel
estimation and self-interference, the full-duplex massive array
cyber-weapon can disable traditional physical layer protecting
schemes, i.e., increasing the transmit power and the number of
antennas at the legitimate transmitter. In addition, when a trans-
mit power optimization scheme for maximizing the difference
between the eavesdropping rate and the legitimate rate is applied
at the full-duplex cyber-weapon, the malicious attack is even more
dangerous. The results also reveal that when the legitimate side
faces an advance adversary, it is essential to prevent important
information in the training phases exposing to the illegitimate
side.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, full-duplex, massive
MIMO, active eavesdropper, jamming, cyber-weapon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems
have become one of the key candidates for the next gener-
ation of wireless networks. In massive MIMO networks, the
transmitters are equipped with a large number of antennas
to serve end-users at the same time in the same frequency
[1]. The advantage of massive MIMO is that the linear signal
processing at the transmitter is nearly optimal thanks to the
large number of antennas. Therefore, increasing the number
of antennas at the transmitter can enhance the array gain with
simple signal processing. Besides, the energy-efficiency and
spectrum-efficiency of massive MIMO networks have been
shown in [2].
Securing information is a challenge with the rapid develop-
ment of wireless communication. Alongside with the conven-
tional cryptography protocol, physical layer security (PLS) for
wireless communication has attracted intensive attention from
the research community recently [3]. The principle of PLS
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is to use the randomness of wireless channels to secure the
transmission. By deploying PLS on top of the conventional
cryptography protocols, the secrecy performance of wireless
communication is enhanced [4]–[7]. There have been studies
on PLS in massive MIMO networks. Artificial noise aided
protecting schemes for massive MIMO networks under the
malicious attack of multi-antenna passive eavesdropper were
investigated in [8]. In [9], the secrecy performance of massive
MIMO relay networks was studied. In [10], the authors
proposed an uplink original symbol phase rotated scenario to
protect the uplink transmission in a massive MIMO network in
the presence of a massive MIMO eavesdropper. Power control
schemes for training and data transmission to enhance the
security of massive MIMO systems with the help of artificial
noise were studied in [11]. In [12], the authors proposed
various data precoders and artificial noise precoder to secure
downlink transmission of a multi-cell massive MIMO system
with large numbers of terminal users and antennas at the
eavesdropper. The aforementioned works focused on designing
the protecting schemes for the legitimate side and considered
the passive eavesdroppers. However, the viewpoint of the
illegitimate side is also important.
A. Related Works
Since understanding the abilities of the illegitimate side
is also crucial to design effective protecting schemes for
the legitimate side [13], [14]. This stream of research has
attracted wide attention from the research community. In
[15], an active half-duplex adversary that can perform as
an eavesdropper or a jammer based on the legitimate side’s
strategy was studied. In [16], secure strategies of a multi-
cell multi-user massive MIMO system under the malicious
attempt of a multi-antenna active eavesdropper were proposed.
In [17], the channel estimation and jamming process of a
massive MIMO eavesdropper for attacking a time division
duplex (TDD) system were demonstrated. In [18], the behavior
of a wireless powered adversary that can operate randomly as
a jammer or an eavesdropper was investigated. In addition,
a power splitting and jamming/eavesdropping probability se-
lection scheme based on the available power at the adversary
were proposed. However, the adversaries in these works can
perform only eavesdropping or jamming.
Yet, the introduction of full-duplex radio, which is promis-
ing to double the spectrum efficiency by allowing a wireless
node to transmit and receive signals simultaneously in the
same frequency band [19], has enabled the adversaries to
perform eavesdropping and jamming at the same time. This
topic has been investigated widely in the literature. In [20],
an optimization scheme for a number of transmit and receive
antennas at the full-duplex MIMO adversary was proposed
2in a multiple-input, multiple-output, multiple eavesdroppers
(MIMOME) wiretap channel. A security scenario, in which a
full-duplex eavesdropper attacks the training phase to modify
the precoder at the transmitter, was presented in [21]. In [22],
the authors proposed a rate maximization scheme for an active
full-duplex legitimate monitor to efficiently eavesdrop a sus-
picious receiver with the assumption that the self-interference
is perfectly cancelled. In [23], a full-duplex active eavesdrop-
per equipped with one transmit and one receive antenna is
considered. The optimization schemes for the performance of
the legitimate and illegitimate side was formulated in a game
frame work where the eavesdropper acts as the leader and the
legitimate user is the follower. The case of partial channel
state information is available at the legitimate users was also
considered. The spoofing attack, in which the active adversary
tries to modify the channel state information (CSI) of the
legitimate channel to obtain more confidential information,
was considered in [24].
However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the ma-
licious abilities of a powerful adversary, which is equipped
with advanced technologies, i.e., full-duplex radio and massive
array, have not been well-understood and considered in the
literature. Motivated by the aforementioned discussions, in
this paper, the abilities of a full-duplex massive array cyber-
weapon in a conventional massive MISO system are inves-
tigated. In this scenario, the cyber-weapon is passive during
the training phases to obtain CSI of the eavesdropping and
jamming channels and then performs eavesdropping the con-
fidential information and jamming the receiver simultaneously.
Some related practical scenarios are: when the police and
other first responder personnel want to interfere the private
mobile radio systems and obtain important information; the
thief wants to attack the wireless alarm systems in single-
family homes so that the burglary will not be detected; or
jamming against LTE, when used for private mobile radio
applications.
B. Contributions
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• In order to study the behavior of the proposed cyber-
weapon, we derive exact closed-form expressions and
tight approximations of the achievable ergodic secrecy
rate of the considered system in the perfect and imperfect
channel estimation scenarios at the cyber-weapon.
• We demonstrate that increasing the number of receive
antennas at the adversary can reduce the effect of the
self-interference imposed by full-duplex mechanism. In
addition, increasing the number of transmit antennas,
i.e., N , at the adversary can reduce the jamming power
proportionally to 1Nα , 0 < α < 1. It is proved that with
a certain proportion of the number of antennas at the
adversary to the number of antennas at the information
source, the illegitimate side can guarantee a zero secrecy
rate. Besides, the illegitimate side benefits from increas-
ing the transmit power at the legitimate side. Therefore,
using high transmit power at the legitimate side does not
guarantee an enhancement in the secrecy performance.
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Fig. 1: System model.
• A power optimization scheme at the adversary to maxi-
mize the difference between the eavesdropping rate and
the legitimate rate is proposed. The result shows that by
applying the power optimization scheme, the adversary
can launch the malicious attack more effectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system
and channel models are described in Section II. The exact
closed-form, approximating, and asymptotic expressions of the
system’s achievable ergodic secrecy rate in the perfect channel
estimation at the cyber-weapon are presented in Section III. In
Section IV, a specific channel estimation scheme at the cyber-
weapon is proposed and evaluated. The numerical results
based on Monte-Carlo methods are presented in Section V to
confirm the tightness of the approximations and the correctness
of our analyses. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
In this paper, we consider a malicious attack in which a
cyber-weapon Eve tries to jam the legitimate receiver Bob and
eavesdrop the confidential informational from the legitimate
transmitter Alice simultaneously. In the considered system,
Alice is equipped with K antennas and Bob is equipped with
a single antenna 1. Meanwhile, Eve operates in full-duplex
mode and is equipped with M receive antennas and N transmit
antennas.
In this system, Alice transmits confidential messages to Bob
over channel vector gL which is modeled by the independent
small-scale fading and large-scale fading (geometric attenua-
tion and shadow fading). The channel vector gL is expressed
as
gL =
√
βLhL, (1)
1The assumption of a single-antenna at users in massive MIMO system
are widely deployed in the literature because of its cost-efficiency, power
efficiency, simplicity, and typically high throughput [13], [16], [25]. In
addition, the case of one single-antenna users can be considered as a special
case of multi-antennas users when the auxiliary antennas can be treated as
additional users. Under the assumption on favorable propagation in massive
MIMO, which holds true when the number of antennas at the transmitter
is large, k autonomous single-antenna users system and one k-antenna user
system have the same energy and spectral efficiency [25]. Besides, the
assumption of a single antenna at Bob makes the considered system simple to
analyze that provides important insights. Particularly, in the case of multiple
antennas are deployed at Bob, the secrecy rate of the considered system still
goes to zero when the numbers of antennas at Alice and Eve go to infinity.
The detailed proof is provided in Appendix E.
3where hL is the K × 1 small-scale fading vector, hL ∼
CN (0, IK), and βL is the large-scale fading coefficient of
the legitimate channel. At the same time, Eve wiretaps these
confidential messages at her receive antennas over K × M
channel matrix GE which can be written as
GE =
√
βEHE, (2)
where HE is the matrix of small-scale fading coefficients
whose elements are CN (0, 1) independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.), and βE is the large-scale fading coefficient
of the eavesdropping channel. Meanwhile, at the transmit
antennas of Eve, jamming signals are transmitted to Bob to
confuse the decoding process. The channel between Eve and
Bob is modeled as follows:
gJ =
√
βJhJ, (3)
where hJ ∼ CN (0, IN ) is the N × 1 vector of small-scale
fading coefficients and βJ is the large-scale fading coefficient
of the jamming channel.
In receiving and transmitting signals simultaneously, Eve
suffers from self-interference. The self-interference between
the transmit and receive antennas of Eve is modeled as an
M ×N channel matrix
GI = σIH I, (4)
whose elements are CN (0, 1) i.i.d., and σI represents
the normalized self-interference impact. If σI = 0, the
self-interference is perfectly cancelled out. Evaluating sef-
interference cancellation/isolation techniques is out of the
scope of this paper.
In this work, we consider a downlink communication of a
TDD MISO system. During each coherence interval, there are
three phases. In the first phase, Bob needs to transmit his pilot
signals to Alice so that she can estimate the legitimate CSI for
performing beamforming. In the second phase, Alice needs to
beamform the downlink pilot to Bob so that he can estimate the
effective channel gain which is used for signal detection [26],
[27]. Finally, in the last phase, Alice transmits information to
Bob. During the first two phases, Eve can take advantage of the
pilots sent from Alice and Bob to estimate the eavesdropping
and jamming channels. To emphasize our idea of a powerful
adversary, we assume that the CSI of the legitimate channel
is perfectly known at Alice 2. Since Alice does not have the
knowledge of CSI of the eavesdropping channel, she deploys
maximal-ratio transmission (MRT)3 which is an optimal linear
precoder in multiple-input single-output (MISO) channels to
2Interested reader may find analysis and numerical results for the case of
imperfect channel estimation at legitimate users in Appendix F.
3In the conventional massive MIMO/MISO networks, MRT is well-known
for its good performance, low-complexity, and high cost-efficiency compared
with the other two famous precoders, i.e., zero-forcing (ZF) and minimum
mean-square error (MMSE) precoders which require huge amount of com-
putational resources at the massive array transmitter. Besides, without any
necessary knowledge of the adversary, it is hard for the legitimate side to
design any enhancing secrecy performance precoders.
transmit her signal to Bob 4. With MRT, the transmit signal
from Alice is formulated as
s =
√
PA gL‖gL‖
x, (5)
where ‖·‖ indicates the Frobenius norm, √PA gL‖gL‖ is the
MRT pre-coding vector, x is the confidential message with
E
{|x|2} = 1, and PA is the average transmit power, i.e.,
E
{|s|2} = PA.
III. PERFECT CHANNEL ESTIMATION AT EVE
In this section, an assumption of perfect channel estimation
at Eve is considered to provide a benchmark and initial insights
of the considered system. The imperfect channel estimation
scheme is discussed in detail in Section IV with a specific
channel estimation method.
It is assumed that Eve can obtain perfect CSI of the
eavesdropping and jamming links, i.e., it knows g¯E = G
H
E
gL
‖gL‖
and gJ. This worst-case assumption is reasonable because Eve
can take advantage of the pilots sent by Alice and Bob during
the legitimate CSI exchanging phases for estimating g¯E and
gJ [17].
The jamming signal from Eve is formulated as
sJ =
√
PJ gJ‖gJ‖
xJ, (6)
where E
{|xJ|2} = 1 and PJ is the average transmit power of
Eve. As a consequence, the received signal at Bob is
yL =
√
PAgHL
gL
‖gL‖
x+
√
PJgHJ
gJ
‖gJ‖
xJ + wL
=
√
PA ‖gL‖x+
√
PJ ‖gJ‖xJ + wL, (7)
where wL ∼ CN (0, σ20) is the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at Bob.
Under the full-duplex mechanism, Eve receives both the
confidential message and her self-interference. Therefore, the
received signal at Eve is given as
yE =
√
PAGHE
gL
‖gL‖
x+
√
PJGI gJ‖gJ‖
xJ +wE, (8)
where wE ∼ σ0CN (0, IM ) is the M×1 AWGN vector at the
receiving side of Eve. Consequently, Eve uses g¯E to perform
maximal ratio combining (MRC). The MRC processed signal
at Eve is
yMRCE =
g¯HE
‖g¯E‖
yE =
√
PA ‖g¯E‖x+
√
PJ g¯
H
E
‖g¯E‖
g¯IxJ +
g¯HE
‖g¯E‖
wE,
(9)
where g¯E = G
H
E
gL
‖gL‖ and g¯I = GI
gJ
‖gJ‖ .
4In the conventional massive MIMO/MISO networks, using artificial noise
(AN) can enhance the secrecy performance. However, without knowledge of
the adversary, the conventional users have to use AN all the time which
leads to inefficiency in using resources. This work aims to analyze and reveal
some insights of a powerful adversary with advance technologies, i.e., massive
arrays antennas and full-duplex radio. We let adequately protecting schemes
for this kind of cyber-weapon for future work.
4A. Closed-form Expressions for Finite K, M, N
1) Ergodic Legitimate Rate: Since Bob only knows the
legitimate channel gL, from (7), the ergodic legitimate rate
is given as 5
RL = EgL
{
log2
(
1 +
E
{|√PA ‖gL‖x|2∣∣gL}
E
{|√PJ ‖gJ‖xJ +wE|2∣∣gL}
)}
= EgL
{
log2
(
1 +
γA ‖gL‖2
γJNβJ + 1
)}
, (10)
where E {X|Y } is conditional expectation of X on Y , γA =
PA
σ20
and γJ = PJσ20 .
From (10), we have the following lemma
Lemma 1: The exact closed-form of the ergodic rate of the
legitimate channel can be formulated as follows:
RL =
1
ln 2
K−1∑
k=0
1
(K − 1− k)!
(−γJNβJ − 1
γAβL
)K−k−1
×
[
− exp
(
γJNβJ + 1
γAβL
)
Ei
(−γJNβJ − 1
γAβL
)
+
K−k−1∑
l=1
(l − 1)!
(−γJNβJ − 1
γAβL
)−l]
, (11)
where Ei(·) is the exponential integral function [28,
Eq. (8.211.1)].
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
The closed-form expression (11) gives us some insights
regarding the effects of K, N , γJ, γA, and can be more
efficiently evaluated compared with (10). However, it involves
the complicated exponential integral function which is not easy
to use for further designs of the considered system. Based (10),
we have the following result.
Lemma 2: The ergodic rate of the legitimate channel is
approximated as
RL ≈ RaL , log2
(
1 +
γAKβL
γJNβJ + 1
)
, (12)
Proof: Eq. (12) is attained by using the identity
1
M
‖v‖2 M→∞→ 1
M
E
{
‖v‖2
}
(13)
where v ∼ CN (0, IM ).
2) Ergodic Eavesdropping Rate: From (9), applying the
properties of circularly symmetric normal vectors, it is ob-
served that
g¯I = GI
gJ
‖gJ‖
∼ σI CN (0, IM ) (14)
and is independent of gJ. Similarly,
g¯HE
‖g¯E‖ g¯I ∼ CN (0, σ
2
I ),
g¯HE
‖g¯E‖wE ∼ CN (0, σ
2
0), and they are independent of g¯E. At
Eve, the information of g¯E and gJ is available. Therefore, from
(9), the ergodic rate of the eavesdropping channel is given as
(15) on the top of the next page.
5This ergodic legitimate rate is obtained under the assumption of worst-
case scenario where the interference plus noise is Gaussian distributed. This
assumption is reasonable since the interference plus noise of (7) approximates
to a Gaussian when the number of antennas at Eve is large.
Lemma 3: The ergodic rate of the eavesdropping channel
admits the following closed-form:
RE =
1
ln 2
M−1∑
m=0
1
(M − 1−m)!
(−γJσ2I − 1
γAβE
)M−m−1
×
[
− exp
(
γJσ
2
I + 1
γAβE
)
Ei
(−γJσ2I − 1
γAβE
)
+
M−m−1∑
p=1
(p− 1)!
(−γJσ2I − 1
γAβE
)−p]
. (16)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Remark 1: From (16), although Eve suffers from her self-
interference, the ergodic eavesdropping rate does not depend
on the number of transmit antennas at Eve. In addition, Eve
can improve the ergodic eavesdropping rate by increasing her
number of receive antennas.
The following lemma follows from (15).
Lemma 4: The eavesdropping channel’s ergodic rate is
approximated as
RE ≈ RaE , log2
(
1 +
γAMβE
γJσ2I + 1
)
. (17)
Proof: Eq. (17) is obtained by using the identity (13).
3) Achievable Ergodic Secrecy Rate: From (11) and (16),
the following theorem is given.
Theorem 1: The exact-closed form expression of the achiev-
able ergodic secrecy rate is given as
RS , [RL −RE]+ , (18)
where RL and RE are given in (11) and (16), respectively, and
[x]+ = max(x, 0).
Since this exact-closed form expression is complex, we de-
velop an approximation of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate
for further important insights, which is based on (12) and (17).
Theorem 2: The achievable ergodic secrecy rate is approx-
imated as
RaS , [RaL −RaE]+ = [log2 (Ψ)]+ , (19)
where
Ψ = 1 +
γJγA[KβLσ
2
I −MβENβJ] + γA[KβL −MβE]
(γJσ2I + 1 + γAMβE)(γJNβJ + 1)
.
(20)
Typically, Alice tries to increase her transmit power to
enhance the secrecy rate. From (19), to gain important insights
of the considered system when the transmit power of Alice is
high, we derive an asymptotic expression for the achievable
ergodic secrecy rate.
Lemma 5: The asymptotic expression for the ergodic secrecy
rate when the transmit power of Alice is high can be expressed
as
Ru,asymS
γA→∞→
[
log2
(
(γJσ
2
I + 1)βLK
(γJNβJ + 1)MβE
)]+
. (21)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
From (21), we can observe that (i) increasing transmit power
at Alice does not guarantee an improvement in the secrecy
5RE = Eg¯E,gJ
log2
1 + E{|√PA ‖g¯E‖x|2∣∣g¯E, gJ}
E
{
|√PJ g¯
H
E
‖g¯E‖ g¯IxJ +
g¯HE
‖g¯E‖wE|2
∣∣g¯E, gJ}
 = Eg¯E
{
log2
(
1 +
γA ‖g¯E‖2
γJσ2I + 1
)}
. (15)
performance of the legitimate side, and (ii) the cyber-weapon
can increase the numbers of its transmit and receive antennas
to reduce the effect of self-interference and enhance the
malicious attack.
B. Asymptotic Analysis
1) Power Scale Law at Eve: Eve can benefit a reduction in
her transmit power by deploying a large number of transmit
antennas.
Corollary 1: The transmit power at Eve can be reduced
proportionally to
(
1
N
)µ
, where 0 < µ < 1.
Proof:
Plugging γJ = γ¯JNµ into (19), where γ¯J is the maximal
transmit power of Eve. When the number of transmit antennas
at Eve is large, Rs can be rewritten as
RaS
N→∞→
[
log2
(
1
γAβEM + 1
)]+
= 0. (22)
Remark 2: From (22), increasing the number of transmit
antennas at Eve can reduce the effect of the self-interference
on the secrecy rate.
2) Rule of the Numbers of Antennas at Eve: It is popular
to assume that Alice can increase the transmit power while
Eve keeps the transmit power constant. However, Eve can also
increase her power proportionally to Alice’s transmit power
for disturbing the legitimate channel. Therefore, when transmit
power at Alice and Eve is high, an interesting question is that
how many antennas Eve should deploy to guarantee RS = 0.
To answer this question, it is considered that the numbers of
transmit and receive antennas at Eve are proportional to the
number of transmit antennas at Alice, i.e., N = nKα, M =
mK
ν , and the transmit power at Eve is proportional to the
transmit power at Alice, i.e., γJ = %γA, where m > 0, n > 0,
α > 0, ν > 0, and % > 0. From (19), we have
RS =
[
log2
(
1 +
%γ2A[KβLσ
2
I − nmKν+αβEβJ]
(γA%σ2I + 1 + γAK
νβE)(γA%KαβJ + 1)
+
γA[KβL − mKνβE]
(γA%σ2I + 1 + γAK
νβE)(γA%KαβJ + 1)
)]+
. (23)
When γA is high, Rs can be rewritten as follows:
RS
γA→∞→
[
log2
(
1 +
%[KβLσ
2
I − nmKν+αβEβJ]
%nKαβJ(%σ2I + mK
νβE)
)]+
.
(24)
From (24), we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2: The number of antennas at Eve for keeping
RS = 0 must be chosen to satisfy the following condition.
ν + α > 1−
log
(
nmβEβJ
βLσ2I
)
log(K)
. (25)
Remark 3: From (25), the sum of the order of the transmit
and receive antennas at Eve increases with logarithm function
of the self-interference effect and it reduces when the number
of transmit antennas at Alice increases.
C. Transmit Power Optimization Scheme for Cyber-weapon
From (19), we can observe that if the cyber-weapon in-
creases transmit power for jamming process, the ergodic rate
of legitimate link and eavesdropping link will reduce. The
reason is that when the transmit power of jamming signal
increases, the self-interference of full-duplex mechanism also
increases at the receive antennas of Eve. However, reducing the
transmit power of Eve will also reduce the ability of degrading
legitimate channel. Therefore, to enhance the malicious attack,
the transmit power at Eve should be optimized to maximize the
difference between the eavesdropping rate and the legitimate
rate. The optimization problem can be formulated as
max
γJ
RaE −RaL
s. t. RaE > R
a
L, (26)
0 ≤ γJ ≤ γJmax, (27)
where γJmax is the maximal transmit power of Eve. From (26),
an equivalent optimization problem can be expressed as
max
γJ
Θ(γJ)
s. t. aγJ + b > 0, (28)
0 ≤ γJ ≤ γJmax, (29)
where Θ(γJ) = 1 + aγJ+bcγ2J +dγJ+e
, a = γA[MNβJβE − σ2I βLK],
b = γA[MβE−KβL], c = σ2I NβJ, d = σ2I +βJN+γAKβLσ2I ,
e = 1 + γAKβL.
The optimal solution for transmit power γ∗J is as follows:
γ∗J =

arg max
γJ∈{0,min(γ∗J1,γJmax)}
Θ(γJ),
if a > 0, b ≥ 0, b2c+ a2e > abd,
min [γ∗J1, γJmax] , if a > 0, b < 0,
0, other cases,
(30)
where γ∗J1 =
1
ac (bc+
√
b2c2 + a2ce− abcd).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
From (30), it is observed that Eve operates in the passive
mode when (i) the legitimate link has advantages over the
eavesdropping link, i.e., b < 0, and the effect of self-
interference is stronger than the jamming link, i.e., a < 0 and
(ii) the eavesdropping link has advantages over the legitimate
link, i.e., b > 0, and the effect of self-interference is stronger
than the jamming link, i.e., a < 0. In the other cases,
depending on the situation, Eve chooses her transmit power.
6IV. IMPERFECT CHANNEL ESTIMATION AT EVE
In the previous sections, we have investigated the considered
system with the assumption of perfect channel estimation at
Eve. In this section, the effect of imperfect channel estimation
at Eve will be studied.
A. MMSE Channel Estimation for the Jamming Link
In order to perform beamforming from Alice to Bob,
both have to exchange their CSI during training sequence.
Normally, this information is exchanged via public channel
and the framework of training sequence can be known at Eve.
Therefore, Eve can perform channel estimation of eavesdrop-
ping and jamming links.
Firstly, Bob sends training signals to Alice for enabling
Alice creating the pre-code matrix. As a consequence, Eve
overhears this information and performs channel estimation
for the jamming channel. At Eve, the received signal from
Bob is given as
yJ =
√
PBgJxsp +wJ, (31)
where xsp is the pilot signal from Bob, E
{|xsp|2} = 1, PB
is the transmit power of Bob, and wJ ∼ σ0CN (0, IN ) is the
AWGN at Bob. In this work, we assume that the minimal mean
square error (MMSE) channel estimation is processed at Eve.
The estimated channel from Eve to Bob is given as
gˆJ = CgJ,yJC
−1
yJ,yJ
yJ =
PBβJ
PBβJ + σ20
gJ +
√PBβJ
PBβJ + σ20
wJx
∗
sp,
(32)
where CgˆJ,yJ =
√PBβJINx∗sp, CyJ,yJ = (PBβJ + σ20)IN .
From (32), it is observed that gˆJ ∼ βJ
√
γB
γBβJ+1
CN (0, IN ),
where γB = PBσ20 .
We denote the estimation error for the jamming channel as
follows:
EJ , gJ − gˆJ =
σ20
PBβJ + σ20
gJ −
√PBβJ
PBβJ + σ20
wJx
∗
sp, (33)
where EJ is independent of gˆJ and EJ ∼
√
βJ
γBβJ+1
CN (0, IN ).
B. MMSE Channel Estimation for the Eavesdropping Link
After receiving the training signals from Bob, Alice sends
feedback to Bob to inform the channel state. At the same time,
Eve obtains these training signals and performs the channel
estimation for the eavesdropping link. The received signal at
Eve is formulated as
yE =
√
PAg¯Exsp +wE, (34)
where wE ∼ σ0CN (0, IM ) is the AWGN at Eve. As a
consequence, the estimated channel at Eve is
gˆE = Cg¯E,yEC
−1
yE,yE
yE =
PAβE
PAβE + σ20
g¯E +
√PAβE
PAβE + σ20
wEx
∗
sp,
(35)
where C is the covariance matrix, Cg¯E,yE =
√PAβEIMx∗sp,
CyE,yE = (PAβE + σ20)IM . As observing (35), gˆE ∼
βE
√
γA
γAβE+1
CN (0, IM ).
We denote the estimation error for the eavesdropping chan-
nel as
EE , g¯E − gˆE =
σ20
PAβE + σ20
g¯E −
√PAβE
PAβE + σ20
wEx
∗
sp. (36)
It is worth noting that because of the property of
MMSE estimation, EE is independent of gˆE and EE ∼√
βE
γAβE+1
CN (0, IN ).
C. Closed-form Expression for Finite K, M, N
1) Ergodic Legitimate Rate: After having the estimated
channel of the jamming channel, Eve creates beamforming
to Bob. The jamming signal from Eve is designed as
sJ =
√
PJ gˆJ‖gˆJ‖
xJ, (37)
Therefore, the received signal at Bob can be formulated as
yL =
√
PA ‖gL‖x+
√
PJ ‖gˆJ‖xJ +
√
PJEHJ
gˆJ
‖gˆJ‖
xJ + wL.
(38)
From (38), when imperfect channel estimation is considered
at Eve, the ergodic rate of the legitimate channel can be
formulated as
RˆL = E
log2
1 + PA ‖gL‖2
PJ
(
E
{
‖gˆJ‖2
}
+ E
{∣∣∣EHJ gˆJ‖gˆJ‖ ∣∣∣2
})
+ σ20


= E
log2
1 + γA ‖gL‖2
γJγBβ2JN
γBβJ+1
+ γJβJγBβJ+1 + 1
 (39)
From (39), the following lemmas are given.
Lemma 6: When imperfect channel estimation is considered
at Eve, the exact closed-form for ergodic rate of the legitimate
channel is given as
RˆL =
1
ln 2
K−1∑
k=0
1
(K − 1− k)!
×
(
−γJγBβ
2
JN + γJβJ + γBβJ + 1
γAβL(γBβJ + 1)
)K−k−1
×
[
− exp
(
γJγBβ
2
JN + γJβJ + γBβJ + 1
γAβL(γBβJ + 1)
)
× Ei
(
−γJγBβ
2
JN + γJβJ + γBβJ + 1
γAβL(γBβJ + 1)
)
+
K−k−1∑
l=1
(l − 1)!
(
−γJγBβ
2
JN + γJβJ + γBβJ + 1
γAβL(γBβJ + 1)
)−l]
.
(40)
Lemma 7: When imperfect channel estimation is considered
at Eve, the approximation for the ergodic rate of the legitimate
channel is formulated as follows:
RˆL ≈ RˆaL , log2
(
1 +
γAKβL
γJβJN
γBβJ
(γBβJ+1)
+ γJβJ(γBβJ+1) + 1
)
.
(41)
7Eq. (41) is obtained by using the identity (13).
Remark 4: From (41), we can observe that
RˆaL
γB→∞→ log2
(
1 +
γAβLK
γJβJN + 1
)
, (42)
which is similar to (12). In other words, Eve can benefit from
the high transmit power at Bob. Besides, another observation
is as follows:
RˆaL
γB→0→ log2
(
1 +
γAβLK
γJβJ + 1
)
, (43)
which means that when Bob uses a very small transmit
power to make the channel estimation process at Eve difficult,
malicious attack benefits from increasing the transmit power
but loses the advantage of the number of transmit antennas at
Eve.
2) Ergodic Eavesdropping Rate: Within the full-duplex
mode, at the receive antennas, Eve receives her jamming
signal. Therefore, the received signals at Eve is formulated
as
yE =
√
PAg¯Ex+
√
PJGI gˆJ‖gˆJ‖
xJ +wE, (44)
After performing channel estimation, Eve deploys MRC tech-
nique to process the received signals. Consequently, the re-
ceived signal at Eve after MRC process is given as
yMRCE =
√
PA ‖gˆE‖x+
√
PA gˆ
H
E
‖gˆE‖
EEx+
√
PJ gˆ
H
E
‖gˆE‖
gˆIxJ
+
gˆHE
‖gˆE‖
wE, (45)
where gˆI = GI
gˆJ
‖gˆJ‖ and gˆI ∼ σI CN (0, IM ).
Alice considers the estimated channel as the true channel
and the last three terms in (45) as the interference and noise.
Therefore, the ergodic eavesdropping rate is given in (46) on
the top of the next page. Step (a) in (46) is obtained by
using the properties of circularly symmetric normal vectors
gˆHE
‖gˆE‖EE ∼ CN
(
0, βEγAβE+1
)
, gˆ
H
E
‖gˆE‖ gˆI ∼ CN (0, σ
2
I ),
gˆHE
‖gˆE‖wE ∼
CN (0, σ20), and the identity (13).
From (46), the following lemmas are given.
Lemma 8: When imperfect channel estimation is considered
at Eve, the exact closed-form expression for the ergodic
eavesdropping rate is formulated as follows:
RˆE =
1
ln 2
M−1∑
m=0
1
(M −m− 1)!
×
(
− (γAβE + 1)(γJσ
2
I + 1) + γAβE
γ2Aβ
2
E
)M−m−1
×
[
− exp
(
(γAβE + 1)(γJσ
2
I + 1) + γAβE
γ2Aβ
2
E
)
× Ei
(
− (γAβE + 1)(γJσ
2
I + 1) + γAβE
γ2Aβ
2
E
)
+
M−m−1∑
p=1
(p− 1)!
(
− (γAβE + 1)(γJσ
2
I + 1) + γAβE
γ2Aβ
2
E
)−p]
.
(47)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.
Lemma 9: When imperfect channel estimation is considered
at Eve, the approximation of the ergodic eavesdropping rate
is given as
RˆE ≈ RˆaE , log2
(
1 +
γAβEM
γAβE
γAβE+1
+ γJσ2I + 1
)
. (48)
Proof: Eq. (48) is obtained by using identity (13).
Similar to the perfect channel estimation scheme, the ergodic
eavesdropping rate in the imperfect channel estimation scheme
depends on the transmit power but does not depend on the
number of transmit antennas at Eve. In addition, as the transmit
power at Alice is high, (48) approximates (17). Therefore, the
channel estimation process at Eve benefits from increasing the
transmit power at Alice.
3) Achievable Ergodic Secrecy Rate: The exact-closed form
expression of the achivable ergodic secrecy rate can be calcu-
lated directly from (40) and (47) as follows:
RˆS = [RˆL − RˆE]+. (49)
From (41) and (48), the approximation for the achievable
ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system is expressed as
RˆaS , [RˆaL − RˆaE]+ =
[
log2(Ψˆ)
]+
, (50)
where
Ψˆ =
[
γJγBβ
2
JN + γJβJ + γBβJ + 1 + γAβLK(γBβJ + 1)
]
[γJγBβ2JN + γJβJ + γBβJ + 1]
×
[
γAβE + (1 + γJσ
2
I )(γAβE + 1)
]
[γAβE(M + 1) + (1 + γJσ2I )(γAβE + 1) + γ
2
Aβ
2
EM ]
.
(51)
Lemma 10: The asymptotic expression of the achievable
ergodic secrecy rate when transmit power at Alice is high
with imperfect channel estimation at Eve is given as follows:
Rˆu,asyms
γA→∞→
[
log2
(
KβL(γBβJ + 1)(γJσ
2
I + 2)
[γJβJ(γBβJN + 1) + γBβJ + 1]βEM
)]+
.
(52)
Remark 5: When imperfect channel estimation is considered
at Eve, increasing transmit power at Alice still cannot guaran-
tee an improvement in secrecy performance for the legitimate
side. Besides, increasing the numbers of transmit and receive
antennas at Eve can reduce the effect of the self-interference
and imperfect channel estimation on the malicious attack.
D. Asymptotic Analysis
1) Power Scale Law at Eve: When imperfect channel
estimation is considered at Eve, the power scale law still holds
true at Eve, i.e., the transmit power at Eve can be reduced
proportionally to
(
1
N
)µ
, where 0 < µ < 1.
Proof: Plugging γJ = γ¯JNµ into (50), where γ¯J is the
maximal transmit power of Eve. When the number of transmit
antennas at Eve, i.e, N is large, Ψˆ can be rewritten as
Ψˆ
N→∞→ 2γAβE + 1
γAβE(M + 2) + 1 + γ2Aβ
2
EM
< 1, (53)
8RˆE = E
log2
1 + PA ‖gˆE‖2
PAE
{∣∣∣ gˆHE‖gˆE‖EE∣∣∣2
}
+ PJE
{∣∣∣ gˆHE‖gˆE‖ gˆI∣∣∣2
}
+ E
{∣∣∣ gˆHE‖gˆE‖wE∣∣∣2
}


(a)
= E
{
log2
(
1 +
γA ‖gˆE‖2
γAβE
γAβE+1
+ γJσ2I + 1
)}
.
(46)
which guarantees that RˆS = 0.
Although suffering from imperfect channel estimation, Eve
can reduce her transmit power by increasing her number of
transmit antennas, followed by a reduction in the effect of
self-interference.
2) Rule for the Number of Antennas at Eve: When im-
perfect channel estimation is taken into account at Eve and
the transmit power at Alice and Eve is high, the number of
antennas at Eve for guaranteeing Rˆs = 0 is constrained as
ν > 1 + log
(
βLσ
2
I (γBβJ + 1)
βJβEm(γBβJnKα + 1)
)
1
log(K)
, (54)
where N = nKα, M = mKν , γJ = %γA, m > 0, n > 0,
α > 0, ν > 0, and % > 0.
As been observed from (54), when Bob uses small transmit
power, (54) becomes the condition for the number of receive
antennas at Eve as follows:
ν > 1 + log
(
βLσ
2
I
βJβEm
)
1
log(K)
. (55)
We also observe that when Bob uses high transmit power, (54)
becomes (25).
E. Transmit Power Optimization Scheme for Cyber-weapon
Similar to the perfect channel estimation scheme, the opti-
mization problem can be formulated as
min
γJ
RˆaE − RˆaL
s. t. RˆaE > Rˆ
a
L, (56)
0 ≤ γJ ≤ γJmax, (57)
where Rth is the pre-defined target rate of the eavesdropping
channel and γJmax is the maximal transmit power of Eve. From
(56), an equivalent optimization problem can be expressed as
min
γJ
Θˆ(γJ)
s. t. aˆγJ + γˆB > 0, (58)
0 ≤ γJ ≤ γJmax, (59)
where Θˆ(γJ) = 1 + aˆγJ+bˆcˆγ2J +dˆγJ+eˆ
, aˆ = γAβEMβJ(γAβE +
1)(γBβJN + 1) − γAKβLσ2I (γAβE + 1)(γBβJ + 1), bˆ =
γA(γBβJ + 1)[(γAβE + 1)βEM − (2γAβE + 1)KβL], cˆ =
βJσ
2
I (γAβE + 1)(γBβJN + 1), dˆ = (2γAβE + 1)(γBβJN +
1)βJ + σ
2
I (γAβE + 1)(γBβJ + 1)(γAKβL + 1), and eˆ =
(γBβJ + 1)(γAKβL + 1)(2γAβE + 1).
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Fig. 2: Secrecy rate versus the number of antennas at Alice.
The optimal solution for transmit power γ∗J is as follows:
γ∗J =

arg max
γJ∈{0,min(γ∗J1,γJmax)}
Θˆ(γJ),
if aˆ > 0, bˆ ≥ 0, bˆ2cˆ+ aˆ2eˆ > aˆbˆdˆ,
min [γ∗J1, γJmax] , if aˆ > 0, bˆ < 0,
0, other cases,
(60)
where γ∗J1 =
1
aˆcˆ (bˆcˆ+
√
bˆ2cˆ2 + aˆ2cˆeˆ− aˆbˆcˆdˆ).
Proof: The proof follows a similar method as given in
Appendix C.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first provide numerical results based
on Monte-Carlo simulation to evaluate the tightness of our
approximation for the ergodic secrecy rate.
In Fig. 2, comparisons among simulation, closed-form, and
the approximation of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate in the
perfect and imperfect channel estimation schemes are demon-
strated respectively. In this setup, the number of transmit
antennas at Alice, the number of receive antennas and the
number of transmit antennas at Eve are set at M = N = K
and M = N = 3K, the transmit power of Alice is set at
γA = 30 dB, the transmit power of Eve is set at γJ = 20 dB,
the transmit power of Bob is set at γB = 10 dB, βE = 1,
βL = 1, βJ = 10−1, and σI = 10. We can observe that
the approximation are tight, especially at large numbers of
antennas. Therefore, we use these approximations for the
following numerical work. In addition, from the figure, as the
number of antennas at Eve is large, the achievable ergodic
secrecy rate decreases. The phenomenon can be explained
from (12)(for the case of perfect channel estimation at Eve)
and (41)(for the case of imperfect channel estimation at Eve).
As setting the number of transmit antennas at Eve, i.e., N ,
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Fig. 3: Secrecy rate with different numbers of antennas and
perfect CSI
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Fig. 4: Secrecy rate with different numbers of antennas and
imperfect CSI
proportional to the number of transmit antennas at Alice, i.e.,
K, the legitimate rate will reduce if the proportion increases.
Besides, from (17) and (48), as the number of receive antennas
at Eve, i.e., M , increases, the eavesdropping rate increases.
As a consequence, the secrecy rate of the considered system
reduces when M and N are set proportional to K and
K increases. Besides, under the effect of imperfect channel
estimation at Eve, the malicious attack is less effective.
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the effect of the numbers of antennas
at Alice and Eve on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the
considered system in the perfect and imperfect channel esti-
mation schemes, respectively. In this setup, K = {50, 100},
M = {50, 100}, N = {50, 100}, βL = βE = 1, βJ = 0.1,
σI = 10, γJ = 10 dB, γB = 10 dB. As increasing the transmit
power at Alice, the achievable ergodic secrecy rate increases
and then saturates. The reason is that although increasing
transmit power can help legitimate link to decrease the effect
of jamming signal from Eve, it also enables Eve to eaves-
drop more information. In addition, in the imperfect channel
estimation scheme, a greater transmit power at Alice also
enhances the channel estimation process at Eve. Therefore, in
the legitimate side’s point of view, raising the transmit power
does not guarantee an improvement in secrecy performance.
However, increasing the number of antennas at Alice can
enhance the ergodic secrecy rate. At the illegitimate side,
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Fig. 5: Effect of transmit power at Bob on the secrecy rate.
raising the number of either transmit or receive antennas can
decrease the secrecy performance of legitimate side. Besides,
the results have shown that the higher the transmit power at
Alice is, the better the effect of increasing the number of
receive antennas at Eve is. Meanwhile, deploying a higher
number of transmit antennas at Eve significantly decreases the
ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system.
Fig. 5 demonstrates the effect of the transmit power at Bob
on the ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system. System
parameters are set as K = 100, M = 50, N = 70, βL = 5,
βJ = 0.5, βE = 1, σI = 2, γJ = 5 dB and γA = {0, 10, 20} dB.
As increasing the transmit power at Bob, the ergodic secrecy
rate decreases. The explanation is that when the transmit
power at Bob increases, the error of the channel estimation
process at Eve for the jamming channel decreases. Therefore,
the jamming process at Eve is more effective followed by a
reduction in the ergodic secrecy rate.
In Fig. 6, the power scale law of the number of transmit
antennas at Eve in the perfect and imperfect channel estimation
schemes is presented. In this figure, the transmit power at Eve
that satisfies RE = RM versus the number of transmit antennas
at Eve is plotted. The system parameters are set γA = γB = 1
dB, M = 30, K = 50, 60, 70, βL = βE = βJ = 1, and σI = 1.
It is observed that when the number of transmit antennas at
Eve is double, the required transmit power at Eve is reduced
approximately by 3 dB.
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 plot the difference between RE and RL
versus γA in the perfect and imperfect channel estimation
schemes. The system is configured as M = 50, N = 50,
βL = βE = βJ = 1, σI = 1, γJmax = 15 dB, and γB = 30 dB.
We consider three cases (i) the cyber-weapon uses the fixed
transmit power for jamming, (ii) the cyber-weapon deploys
transmit power optimization scheme for jamming based on
the statistical CSI, and (iii) the simulation of the case when
the cyber-weapon implements transmit power optimization
scheme based on the instantaneous CSI 6. The power opti-
mization scheme based on the instantaneous CSI is performed
6From Eve’s point of view, it is very hard or almost impossible to obtain
the instantaneous CSI of the channel from Alice to Bob for optimizing its
transmit power.
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as follows:
max
γJ
RinstE −RinstL
s. t. RinstE > R
inst
L , (61)
0 ≤ γJ ≤ γJmax. (62)
From the figures, the case of optimal transmit power with
the instantaneous CSI outperforms the other cases at the ex-
pense of the full system’s CSI knowledge. It is obviously that
by using the instantaneous CSI, Eve can adjust her transmit
power more quickly followed by a better performance 7. The
case of optimal transmit power with the statistical CSI shows
higher RE−RL than that in the maximum transmit power case
as the transmit power at Alice decreases. The reason is that
when the transmit power at Alice is small, the transmit power
of Eve in the optimal transmit power case can be decreased
to reduce the effect of the self-interference, followed by an
enhancement in the eavesdropping rate. Meanwhile, when the
transmit power at Alice is high, both Alice and Eve receive
more information. In this situation, Eve increases her transmit
power to degrade the legitimate channel. Besides, increasing
the number of antennas at Alice can restrain the effectiveness
of the power optimization scheme at Eve.
In Fig. 9, the performance comparison of the proposed
cyber-weapon, a massive array eavesdropper, and a massive
array jammer is shown. In this setup, three adversaries have the
same number of antennas, i.e., the massive array eavesdropper
and jammer are equipped with 100 antennas, the cyber-
weapon is equipped with 50 receive antennas and 50 transmit
antennas. Other parameters are set as βL = βE = βJ = 1,
σI = 1, γJmax = 15 dB. The massive array jammer uses
γJmax = 15 dB as its jamming power. From the figure, we
can observe that from the view-point of the illegitimate side,
a massive array jammer have the worst performance. The
legitimate side can easily counter the attack of the jammer by
increasing its transmit power. A massive array eavesdropper
shows a better performance than the jammer does when her
can successfully wiretap the information from the legitimate
7The proposed optimization scheme uses the large-scale fading time scale
which changes at least some 40 times slower than the small-scale fading
(instantaneous channel gain) [29]. As a consequence, our proposed power
allocation is done a few times per second, while the power allocation relying
on the instantaneous channel gains must be done every some milliseconds.
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Fig. 7: Power optimization at Eve with perfect CSI
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side. However, when the transmit power at the legitimate side
increases, no improvement is witnessed in the performance
of the eavesdropper. The proposed cyber-weapon achieves the
best performance among the three adversaries since her can
dynamically launch different malicious attack scenarios.
Fig. 10 illustrates the effect of Eve’s self-interference on the
ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system in the perfect and
imperfect channel estimation schemes. The system parameters
are set as M = 40, K = 100, N = 40, βL = 10, βE = βJ = 1,
and γA = γJ = 1 dB. When the effect of self-interference
increases, the ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system
increases. Besides, it also reveals that the higher effect of
self-interference leads to the smaller error of the imperfect
channel estimation is. It can be explained that when the self-
interference effect is high, the eavesdropping rate converges
to zero. Therefore, the difference in the ergodic rates of the
perfect channel estimation and imperfect channel estimation
schemes is considered by the imperfect channel estimation of
the jamming link.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, from the perspective of the illegitimate side,
the abilities of a full-duplex massive array cyber-weapon have
been investigated with taking the effect of imperfect channel
estimation at the cyber-weapon into consideration. The exact
closed-form, tight approximation, and asymptotic expressions
of the ergodic secrecy rate of the considered system in the
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Fig. 9: Performance comparison of the proposed
cyber-weapon with a massive array eavesdropper and a
massive array jammer.
perfect and imperfect channel estimation schemes at the cyber-
weapon have been derived. The results have revealed that
under disadvantage conditions, i.e., imperfect channel estima-
tion and the self-interference, the proposed cyber-weapon can
effectively degrade the legitimate channels while successfully
obtaining the confidential information. In addition, a transmit
power optimization scheme at the cyber-weapon can help
to eavesdrop confidential information even more efficiently.
When the advanced technologies, i.e., full-duplex radio and
massive array, are deployed by the illegitimate side, the legit-
imate side should apply protecting scenarios for the training
phases as well as the information transmission phase.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1 AND LEMMA 3
From (10), the ergodic rate of the legitimate channel is
expressed as
RL = E
{
log2
(
1 +
γA ‖gL‖2
γJNβJ + 1
)}
. (A.1)
From (1), it is observed that ‖gL‖2 = βL ‖hL‖2 in which
X = ‖hL‖2 follows the gamma distribution, i.e., X ∼
Γ(K, 1). The probability density function (PDF) of X is
fX (x) =
1
Γ(K)x
K−1 exp(−x). Thus, the ergodic rate of the
legitimate channel is derived as follows:
RL =
∞∫
0
log2
(
1 +
γAβL
γJNβJ
x
)
fX (x) dx
=
1
Γ(K) ln 2
∞∫
0
ln
(
1 +
γAβL
γJNβJ
x
)
xK−1 exp(−x)dx
=
1
ln 2
K−1∑
k=0
1
(K − 1− k)!
(−γJNβJ − 1
γAβL
)K−k−1
×
[
− exp
(
γJNβJ + 1
γAβL
)
Ei
(−γJNβJ − 1
γAβL
)
+
K−k−1∑
l=1
(l − 1)!
(−γJNβJ − 1
γAβL
)−l]
. (A.2)
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Fig. 10: Effect of the self-interference on the secrecy rate.
(A.2) is obtained with the help of [28, Eq. (4.337.5)]. Simi-
larly, the exact closed-form for the ergodic rate of the eaves-
dropping is attained as in (16).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
When the transmit power of Alice is high, the asymptotic
expression for the ergodic legitimate rate can be calculated as
Ru,asymS =
[
log2
(
lim
γA→∞
Ψ(γJ)
)]+
=
[
log2
(
(γJσ
2
I + 1)βLK
(γJNβJ + 1)MβE
)]+
. (B.1)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF POWER OPTIMIZATION SCHEME AT EVE
The first derivative of Θ(γJ) is given as
Θ
′
(γJ) =
−acγ2J + 2bcγJ + ae+ bd
(cγ2J + dγJ + e)
2
. (C.1)
From the condition aγJ + b > 0, we consider three cases,
i.e., a ≤ 0 and b > 0, a > 0 and b ≥ 0, and a > 0 and b < 0.
1) Case 1— a ≤ 0 and b > 0: in this case, it is observed
that Θ(γJ) is minimal when γJ = 0. Therefore, the optimal
solution for transmit power at Eve γ∗J = 0.
2) Case 2— a > 0 and b ≥ 0: Considering the discriminant
of quadratic equation Θ
′
(γJ) = 0 as follows:
∆ = 4b2c2 + 4a2ce+ 4abcd. (C.2)
If ∆ ≤ 0 then Θ′(γJ) < 0 ∀γJ > 0. Therefore, Θ(γJ) is
a decreasing function ∀γJ > 0. The optimal solution γ∗J is
γ∗J = 0.
If ∆ > 0, equation Θ
′
(γJ) = 0 has two different roots
γ∗J1 =
2bc+
√
∆
2ac
> 0 and γ∗J2 =
2bc−√∆
2ac
. (C.3)
We consider two sub-cases 2bc >
√
∆ and 2bc <
√
∆.
In the sub-case 2bc >
√
∆, we can observe that γ∗J2 > 0.
As a consequence, Θ(γJ) is increasing with γ∗J2 ≤ γJ ≤ γ∗J1
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and decreasing with γJ > γ∗J1 and 0 < γJ < γ
∗
J2. Therefore,
the optimal solution γ∗J is
γ∗J = arg max
γJ∈{0,γJmax,γ∗J1}
Θ(γJ). (C.4)
In the sub-case 2bc <
√
∆, it is observed that γ∗J2 < 0.
Therefore, Θ(γJ) is increasing with 0 ≤ γJ ≤ γ∗J1 and
decreasing with γ∗J1 < γJ. As a result, the optimal solution
γ∗J is
γ∗J = arg maxPJ∈{0,γJmax,γ∗J1}
Θ(γJ). (C.5)
3) Case 3— a > 0 and b < 0: The condition for the
transmit power of Eve becomes γJ > −ba > 0. We assume
that γJmax > −ba . It is observed that ∆ > 0, γ
∗
J1 > 0, and
γ∗J2 < 0. Therefore, Θ(γJ) is increasing with
−b
a ≤ γJ ≤ γ∗J1
and decreasing with γJ > γ∗J1. As a result, the optimal solution
γ∗J is
γ∗J = min (γ
∗
J1, γJmax) . (C.6)
In the other cases, i.e., aγJ + b < 0, the ergodic eaves-
dropping rate is smaller than the ergodic legitimate rate , i.e.,
RlE < R
u
L. In these cases, the optimal transmit power of Eve
is γ∗J = 0.
APPENDIX D
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From (35), it is observed that
E
{
gˆEgˆ
H
E
}
=
[ P2Aβ3E
(PAβE + σ20)2
+
PAβ2Eσ20
(PAβE + σ20)2
]
IM .
(D.1)
Besides, we have that g¯E ∼
√
βE CN (0, IM ). Therefore,
gˆE ∼ βE
√
γA
γAβE+1
CN (0, IM ). Consequently, ‖gˆE‖2 can be
rewritten as ‖gˆE‖2 = γAβ
2
E
1+γAβE
Y, where Y follows gamma
distribution, i.e., Y ∼ Γ(M, 1). The PDF of Y is
fY (y) =
1
Γ(M)
yM−1 exp(−y). (D.2)
The exact closed-form of the ergodic eavesdropping rate
when imperfect channel estimation is considered at Eve can
be calculated as follows:
RE = E
{
log2
(
1 +
γA ‖gˆE‖2
γAβE
γAβE+1
+ γJσ2I + 1
)}
=
∞∫
0
1
Γ(M)
log2
(
1 +
γ2Aβ
2
E
(γAβE + 1)(γJσ2I + 1) + γAβE
y
)
× yM−1 exp(−y)dy
=
1
ln 2
M−1∑
m=0
1
(M −m− 1)!
×
(
− (γAβE + 1)(γJσ
2
I + 1) + γAβE
γ2Aβ
2
E
)M−m−1
×
[
− exp
(
(γAβE + 1)(γJσ
2
I + 1) + γAβE
γ2Aβ
2
E
)
× Ei
(
− (γAβE + 1)(γJσ
2
I + 1) + γAβE
γ2Aβ
2
E
)
+
M−m−1∑
p=1
(p− 1)!
(
− (γAβE + 1)(γJσ
2
I + 1) + γAβE
γ2Aβ
2
E
)−p]
.
(D.3)
(D.3) is obtained with the help of [28, Eq. (4.337.5)].
APPENDIX E
ANALYSIS FOR THE CASE OF MULTI-ANTENNA RECEIVER
We use the channel capacity of the point-to-point Gaussian
MIMO channel as an upper bound for the legitimate rate of
the channel from Alice to Bob when multiple antennas are
used at Bob. We assume the most optimistic scenario when
the multi-antenna receiver can cancel all the interference from
the jammer. Thus, the channel capacity of the point-to-point
Gaussian MIMO channels with equal power allocation at the
transmitter is given as [30], [31]
CL = E
{
log2 det
(
IV +
(γA
K
)
HH∗
)}
, (E.1)
where det(·) denotes the determinant, K and V are the
numbers of antennas at Alice and Bob, respectively, H is the
V ×K channel matrix from Alice to Bob, elements of H are
i.i.d. CN (0, 1) random variables. For fixed V , HH∗K → IV
almost surely when K goes to infinity. The capacity is re-
written as
CL → V log2(1 + γA). (E.2)
From the above upper bound of the legitimate rate and (17),
we have an upper bound for the secrecy rate of the considered
system with multiple antennas at Bob as follows:
RS →
[
log2
(
(1 + γA)
V (γJσ
2
I + 1)
γJσ2I + 1 + γAMβE
)]+
. (E.3)
From (E.3), we can see that when the number of receive
antennas at Eve is large, this secrecy rate upper bound still
converges to zero.
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APPENDIX F
ANALYSIS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR THE CASE OF
IMPERFECT CHANNEL ESTIMATION AT THE LEGITIMATE
USERS
A. Channel Estimation at Alice
Bob sends training signals to Alice for enabling Alice
creating the pre-code matrix. At Alice, the received signal is
yA =
√
PBgLxsp +wA, (F.1)
where wA ∼ σ0CN (0, IM ) is the AWGN at Alice. In this
work, we assume that MMSE channel estimation is processed
at Alice. The estimated channel from Alice to Bob is given as
gˆL = CgL,yAC
−1
yA,yA
yA =
PBβL
PBβL + σ20
gL +
√PBβL
PBβL + σ20
wAx
∗
sp,
(F.2)
where CgˆL,yA =
√PBβLIMx∗sp, CyA,yA = (PBβL + σ20)IM .
From (F.2), it is observed that gˆL ∼ CN (0, σ2AIN ), γB = PBσ20 ,
and σA = βL
√
γB
γBβL+1
.
We denote the estimation error for the jamming channel as
follows:
EA , gL − gˆL =
σ20
PBβL + σ20
gL −
√PBβL
PBβL + σ20
wAx
∗
sp, (F.3)
where EA is independent of gˆL and EA ∼ CN (0, (βL −
σ2A)IM ).
B. Channel Estimation at Bob
After estimating the channel from Bob to Alice, Alice sends
pilot back to Bob. The purpose is to provide Bob CSI for
decoding the signals. The received signal at Bob is
yB =
√
PAgHL
gˆL
‖gˆL‖
xsp + wB =
√
PAcBxsp + wB, (F.4)
where cB = gHL
gˆL
‖gˆL‖ . We have E {cB} = σA
Γ( 2K+12 )
Γ(K) and
E
{|cB|2} = (K − 1)σ2A + βL.
Bob performs MMSE to estimate cB,
cˆB = E {cB}+ CcB,yBC−1yB,yB(yB − E {yB})
=
PAVar(cB)cB +
√PAVar(cB)wB + σ20E {cB}
PA Var(cB) + σ20
, (F.5)
where CcB,yB =
√PA(E
{|cB|2} − (E {cB})2) =√PAVar(cB) and CyB,yB = PA(E{|cB|2} −
(E {cB})2) + σ20 = PA Var(cB) + σ20 . We also
have E {cˆB} = γA Var(cB)γA Var(cB)+1E {cB} and E
{|cˆB|2} =
γA Var(cB)
(γA Var(cB)+1)2
(
γAVar(cB)E
{|cB|2}+ (E {cB})2 + Var(cB)) .
The estimation error is
EB = cB − cˆB = σ
2
0cB −
√PA Var(cB)wB − σ20E {cB}
PAVar(cB) + σ20
.
(F.6)
We have E {EB} = E{cB}γA Var(cB)+1 , E
{|EB|2} =
E{|cB|2}+(E{cB})2+γA[Var(cB)]2
(γA Var(cB)+1)2 , and Var(EB) =
E{|cB|2}+γA[Var(cB)]2
(γA Var(cB)+1)2 .
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Fig. 11: Secrecy rate with imperfect CSI at the legitimate
users
C. Legitimate Rate
The received signal at Bob in information transmission
phase is
yB =
√
PAcBx+
√
PJ ‖gˆJ‖xJ +
√
PJEHJ
gˆJ
‖gˆJ‖
xJ + wB.
(F.7)
Since Bob only knows the estimated effective channel cˆB, the
ergodic legitimate rate is given in (F.8) on the top of the next
page. It is observed that the ergodic legitimate rate in this
case is lower than that of the case in which perfect channel
estimation is considered at the legitimate users. The ergodic
illegitimate rate can be calculated similarly to (46).
D. Numerical Results
Fig. 11 shows the simulation results of the considered
system’s secrecy rate in the case of imperfect channel esti-
mation is considered at the legitimate users. In this setup,
K = M = N = 50, βL = 10, βE = 1, βJ = 0.1,
σI = 10, γJ = 10 dB, γB = {5, 10, 15} dB. It is observed
that when the transmit power at Alice increases, the secrecy
rate increases and then saturates. This phenomenon is similar
to the phenomenon in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. Besides, Fig. 11 also
demonstrates the effect of transmit power at Bob. Decreasing
the transmit power at Bob makes the channel estimation
process at Eve more difficult and removes the advantage of
multiple jamming antennas at Eve, followed by an increase in
the secrecy rate. This point has been discussed in Remark 4.
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